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DUE PROCESS WITHOUT JUDICIAL PROCESS?:
ANTIADVERSARIALISM
IN AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE
Norman W. Spaulding*
[T]he real realm of injustice is not in an amoral and prelegal state of
nature. It does not appear only on those rare occasions when a political
order wholly collapses. It does not stand outside the gate of even the best
of known states. Most injustices occur continuously within the framework
of an established polity with an operative system of law, in normal times.
Often it is the very people who are supposed to prevent injustice who, in
their official capacity, commit the gravest acts of injustice, without much
protest from the citizenry.1

I. THE SOURCES OF ANTIADVERSARIALISM
For decades now, American scholars of procedure and legal ethics have
remarked upon the death of the jury trial. If jury trial is not in fact dead as
an institution for the resolution of disputes, it is certainly “vanishing.”2
Even in complex litigation, courts tend to facilitate nonadjudicative
resolutions—providing sites for aggregation, selection of counsel, fact
gathering, and finality (via issue and claim preclusion)—rather than trial on
the merits in any conventional sense of the term.3 In some high-stakes
criminal cases and a fraction of civil cases, jury trial will surely continue
well into the twenty-first century. Wall-to-wall media coverage of the more
sensational of these will continue as well; Americans have a very long and

* Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I am grateful to the Fordham Law
Review’s editors for assistance bringing this Article to publication, to Bruce Green and
Russell Pearce for the invitation to contribute to the colloquium entitled Civil Litigation
Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials held at Fordham University School of Law, to the other
colloquium participants for their helpful feedback, to my able research assistant Joe DeMott,
and, as always, to Ticien Sassoubre for help in every phase of the Article’s development.
For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the
Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates,
and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2017).
1. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 19 (1990).
2. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
3. Emery G. Lee III et al., Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, 12
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 222 (2015) (noting an increased rate of multidistrict
litigation relative to class actions).
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deeply ingrained habit of treating trials as a form of public entertainment.4
But as a widespread legal and cultural practice—one that people experience
as active participants, and one that plays a fundamental role in the
administration of justice—jury trial is indeed vanishing.
Some scholars view the disappearance of jury trials in civil cases as a
Seventh Amendment crisis, the product of a gradual but systematic and
unconstitutional redistribution of decision-making authority from juries to
judges over the last 175 years.5 Judges, on this account, are not only
“managerial”6 but increasingly imperial.7
On the other hand, legal historians remind us that even at its apogee in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, jury trials accounted for around
one-third of dispositions in the state courts.8 Long before the Federal
Arbitration Act and more recent innovations, private settlement and
alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution played a more significant role
than the lore surrounding jury trials would suggest.9 We also know that
concerns about the cost and delay of litigation animated well-founded and
vituperative criticisms of the adversary system from the very earliest days
of the republic. These critiques motivated the exploration and endorsement
of alternatives.10 And we know that Americans have a deep, sometimes
quite baleful, commitment to vigilantism and other forms of self-help.11
Still, there is more than a little truth in the judicial imperialism critique.
Settlement and alternative dispute resolution have become default modes of
disposition. Judges not only defer to these alternatives and use pretrial
procedures to promote them, they increasingly force parties to use them and
have, for the most part, blinked at commentary revealing evidence of
profound defects in them.12 Nor is there any gainsaying the gradual
4. On the popularity of trials as entertainment in early American history, see CARL R.
LOUNSBURY, THE COURTHOUSES OF EARLY VIRGINIA: AN ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY 5
(2005). On trials and American popular consciousness, see Carol J. Clover, Law and the
Order of Popular Culture, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 97, 110 (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 2000).
5. See generally SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES (2016).
6. See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); see also Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose
Eyes Are You Going to Believe?: Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism,
122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009).
8. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 465 (gathering civil trial data); see also George Fisher,
Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000).
9. See generally Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation: The NineteenthCentury Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal
of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423 (2009).
10. Norman W. Spaulding, The Luxury of the Law: The Codification Movement and the
Right to Counsel, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 991–92 (2004).
11. Norman W. Spaulding, The Impersonation of Justice: Lynching, Dueling, and
Wildcat Strikes in Nineteenth-Century America, in THE ROUTLEDGE RESEARCH COMPANION
TO LAW AND HUMANITIES IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Nan Goodman & Simon Stern
eds., 2017).
12. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Vaden v. Discover
Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Wright
v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
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reallocation of authority from jury to judge through the expansion of
procedural tools that enable judges to remove cases from the jury during
trial and to dispose of cases before trial by substituting the judge’s
assessment of the facts for the jury’s.13 The heady days of jury supremacy
at the founding of the republic—when both questions of law and fact were
within their purview and when trial before a new jury was the primary
appellate remedy—are so distant as to seem part of an altogether foreign
regime of dispute resolution.
But the imperialism critique frequently misses the extent to which
skepticism about the adversary system is itself rooted in Jacksonian populist
and New Deal progressive political movements. Nineteenth-century
populists loathed the intricacies and elitism of common law adjudication.14
The codification movement they supported was directed at creating a more
democratically legitimate and responsive system of substantive and
procedural law—a system in which access to law would not depend on
access to counsel.15 As my colleague Amalia Kessler has shown, some
communities explored radical alternatives to the adversary system.16 Jury
trial may have many democratic virtues, but in the eyes of antebellum
populist reformers, it came along with heavy antidemocratic baggage.
Modern proceduralists often celebrate the development of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and the innovations Dean Charles Clark
built into the framework of the rules to make federal litigation more
accessible to ordinary litigants (through the merger of law and equity, the
short, plain statement rule for pleading, open-handed discovery, liberal
joinder, etc.).17 But, in their pedagogy and research agendas, proceduralists
focus intensely and almost exclusively on the bare fraction of civil cases
500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging
Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 82 (noting that judges impose mediation on
litigants). For a summary of the standard critiques of alternative dispute resolution, see
Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Mediation, Arbitration, and Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR), in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (James
D. Wright ed., 2015); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent
Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 87 n.1 (2012)
(gathering commentary); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a
‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Nov. 1, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-thejustice-system.html [perma.cc/6JKA-4ZZM]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff,
Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK
(Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitrationeverywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/MH64-DJW9].
13. On the expansion of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, compare
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), with Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372
(1943), and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). On screening complaints for
“plausibility” based on trial judges’ “common sense,” see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
664, 670 (2009).
14. Spaulding, supra note 10, at 986–87.
15. See generally CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A
STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981).
16. See Kessler, supra note 9, at 449.
17. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
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decided in federal courts, leaving largely unexamined the norms and rules
governing the tens of millions of cases affecting the lives of ordinary
Americans in state courts and state and federal agencies.18 Moreover,
proceduralists typically fail to read Dean Clark’s innovations against a
larger backdrop of hostility to the courts among New Dealers and perhaps
especially among the New Deal lawyers who would rise to the bench and
elite positions in the executive branch.19
That hostility was real. Lochner-era laissez-faire jurisprudence and
judicial procedures, such as the antistrike injunction that had been used to
thwart the labor movement, were fresh in their minds.20 The issue was not
just the lingering effect of reservations among Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court in the 1930s regarding the Article I Commerce Clause powers of
Congress to respond to the Great Depression.21 There was a broader
feeling, sharpened by the antistrike injunction experience, that the adversary
system itself (in its ethics, its procedures, and in the professional identity of
lawyers) was an obstacle to sensible democratic governance and
progressive reform.22 To read the FRCP in context, then, is to remember
that Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act23 in the same year that it
passed the Securities Exchange Act of 193424 (“the 1934 Act”) and a year
before it passed the National Labor Relations Act.25 These statutes express
the deeper vision of New Deal reformers, one in which litigation would be
reduced to a subordinate role in American law. Law in the first instance
was to be generated, interpreted, and applied to social action in and through
administrative agencies, not courts.
Both pieces of legislation established a new executive branch agency
designed to regulate an area of primary economic action.26 The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) were authorized to promulgate rules, investigate violations, initiate
enforcement actions, and, in some cases, to be the court of first instance.27
Together with the Securities Act of 1933 (“the 1933 Act”), the 1934 Act
was read to permit private rights of action, which require an Article III

18. Even in administrative law, the actual mechanics of administration are often ignored
in favor of abstract constitutional and theoretical inquiry. There are, of course, notable
exceptions. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of
Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2014).
19. See generally PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982).
20. See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1930).
21. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
22. These ideas are distilled in the quintessential New Deal lawyer-turned-judge Jerome
Frank’s lacerating critique of the adversary system. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL:
MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949).
23. Ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).
24. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 3, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d).
25. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169).
26. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78d.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78d; 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
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forum for adjudication,28 but the core work of enforcement, particularly the
calibration of enforcement policy, was supposed to rest squarely with the
agency.29 The 1933 Act complemented this agency-centric regulatory
approach through information-forcing disclosure provisions refined by
agency rulemaking.30 The hope and expectation was that the act of
registration and preparation of associated securities disclosures would have
deep behavioral consequences in the financial markets. From a structural
and regulatory standpoint then, judicial enforcement was tertiary to
disclosure and the agency’s policy-based rulemaking. No one imagined
that judicial enforcement would be unnecessary, but there is a fundamental
difference between the structure of the 1933 and 1934 Acts on the one hand,
and, legislation that merely establishes substantive rights or regulatory
limits while leaving enforcement to private actors and the Department of
Justice (DOJ)—a court-centric approach.31
The very highest ambitions of the New Deal reformers to circumvent
judicial review are apparent in the operation of the NLRB.32 Established to
protect the rights of workers to form unions and engage in collective
bargaining, the NLRB is composed of five members appointed by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to five-year terms.33
Initial adjudications of labor disputes are conducted before administrative
law judges with appeals to a three-member panel of the Board.34 The
NLRB’s general counsel is responsible for filing complaints either on her
own initiative or after receiving allegations of unfair labor practices from
employees.35 Fearful that the work of the NLRB would be undermined by
unsympathetic judges, the NLRB very quickly developed a set of practices
that diminished the likelihood that its adjudications would be subject to
judicial review.36 As Peter Low and John Jeffries note:
Interestingly, although the NLRB also has rule-making authority, it is
notoriously reluctant to use it. Despite repeated pleas from judges,
practitioners, and academics, the Board consistently eschews formal rulemaking in favor of case-by-case adjudication. The reasons for this
practice may be many, but one factor repeatedly cited by experts is the
agency’s desire to insulate itself from effective judicial review by
submerging its judgments in the facts of particular cases. Perhaps not
entirely unrelated is the widespread perception that NLRB adjudication is
ideological and politicized, characterized by sharp swings in enforcement
28. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
29. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); A.C. Pritchard & Robert B.
Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841 (2009).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa.
31. Reconstruction enforcement legislation of the 1860s and 1870s is a paradigmatic
example of this court-centric approach. See generally HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW (1982).
32. This example is drawn from PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 320–24 (5th ed. 2004).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 153.
34. Id. § 160.
35. Id.
36. LOW & JEFFRIES, JR., supra note 32, at 321.
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perspective as annual presidential appointments remake the Board’s
composition.
Obviously, the [NLRB] fall[s] very far short of the model of judicial
independence established by Article III. Indeed, the Board’s structure
suggests, and the history of the National Labor Relations Act confirms,
that the Board was not intended to provide impartial, apolitical
adjudication of labor disputes. Instead, it was created to enforce certain
policy objectives and constituted so that the President, acting with the
advice and consent of the Senate, can assert relatively short-term political
control over Board membership.37

There is a right of appeal to the U.S. courts of appeal if a party believes
the NLRB’s decision to be erroneous, but by nesting its legal conclusions
and policy judgments in the facts of individual cases, the NLRB reduces the
likelihood of reversal on appeal.38 That is because the standard of review
requires heightened deference as to questions of fact under Crowell v.
Benson,39 and Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council40
requires deference with respect to reasonable agency constructions of
organic statutes.41 To be sure, the Board has no substantive power to
coerce compliance. But if aggrieved parties facing these deferential
standards of review comply rather than appeal to the federal courts, the
Board’s decisions are final.
Thus, judicial review in the ostensibly more independent federal courts is
merely a potential, and almost always post hoc, intervention.42 Law either
operates in the absence of adjudication as regulated entities conform to
standards set by Congress, or it takes effect through non-Article III
adjudications that are responsive to enforcement priorities set by agency
policymakers and the President. This is law before the courts, law outside
the courts, law unhinged from the adversary system and its traditional
forum.
If the NLRB’s adjudication practices and avoidance of formal
rulemaking are somewhat unique, if most agency adjudication and
rulemaking follows the pathways of notice and comment that enable
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, the NLRB example
is nevertheless a powerful reminder of the New Deal reformer’s first
principles: their confidence in, and elevation of, extrajudicial process; their
suspicion of the adversary system and its traditional forum; and their sense
of how far the interpretation and application of law needed to be removed
from traditional structures of adjudication to make New Deal political
priorities real in the lives of workers and consumers.

37. Id. at 321–22.
38. Id. at 321.
39. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
40. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
41. Id. at 844.
42. The intervention is post hoc because the NLRB’s submersion of rulemaking in
adjudication effectively circumvents the structure of notice, comment, and judicial review of
agency rulemaking embedded in the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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The point of all this is not that proceduralists have been wrong to insist
upon the egalitarian ambitions of Dean Clark or the generous construction
of the FRCP by the New Deal Supreme Court relative to the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts. Those ambitions were real. But New Deal innovations in
the federal law of procedure must also be interpreted against the backdrop
of a far broader political and legal project explicitly dedicated to the
displacement, if not the subordination of, the adversary system. Indeed,
New Deal reformers, drawing upon standards of internal administrative law
that run back to the earliest days of the republic, built the modern regulatory
state on an altogether different theory of the administration of justice.43
Rational, scientific expertise was to drive not only the resolution of political
questions into specific policy objectives and associated legal rules but also
the resolution of discrete disputes about the application of policy to the
facts of social and economic life. America was to become a republic of
experts in which policy would be established and implemented by
empirically informed, politically responsive technocrats.44 The bench and
bar were not only to rely upon these technocrats and defer to their judgment
but to celebrate the virtues of avoiding adjudication in court.45 Indeed, elite
New Deal lawyers were among the principal architects of the alternative
theory and leaders in its implementation in the agencies and Congress.46
As importantly, at least some of the Advisory Committee’s most
significant innovations in procedure, most obviously the incorporation of
broad open-handed discovery, can be read as disfavoring trial by providing
for the disclosure of evidence on terms that encourage settlement and
summary judgment. It seems likely that discovery practice—vexed as it has
become and desperate as modern courts and the Advisory Committee have
been to restrain it47—has played an important role in diminishing the
perceived need for trial.48 Notably, in the briefing for Hickman v. Taylor49
43. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 218, 251, 279 (2012).
44. See H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 41 (1981) (“The scientific
‘expert’ thus became the central figure in Frankfurter’s plan for government: it was the
expert who would study society, accumulate facts, draw conclusions, and educate the public
as to the rational necessity of those conclusions. Frankfurter’s was thus a philosophy that
was both elitist and democratic: elitist in its demand for expert knowledge; democratic in its
faith that the public at large was educable.”); see also MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX
FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 200 (1982).
45. On the use of standing doctrine to insulate New Deal agency action, see Daniel E.
Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine?: An Empirical
Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591 (2010); Cass R.
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?: Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 179 (1992).
46. See generally IRONS, supra note 19. Progressives also played a larger role than has
traditionally been assumed in the development of arbitration as an alternative to trial in the
early twentieth century and in the drafting and passage of the Federal Arbitration Act. See
generally Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of
Progressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940 (2015).
47. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007).
48. Richard Marcus, The Story of Hickman: Preserving Adversarial Incentives While
Embracing Broad Discovery, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 307, 310 (Kevin M. Clermont
ed., 2004).
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before the Supreme Court, it was progressive labor lawyers who argued that
the new discovery rules were “written with a view toward eliminating the
adversary system.”50 In the new discovery rules, they saw yet another New
Deal displacement of the adversary system intended to level the playing
field between large, information-rich defendants and the injured employees
who sued them. Corporate defense counsel, who typically enjoy early
access to relevant witnesses and documentary evidence, would be obliged
to disclose their findings to promote “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant
facts.”51 In creating the doctrine of work product protection, the Court
squarely rejected the argument that the discovery rules were designed to
eliminate the adversary system.52 But it did so not because it could locate a
decisive rebuttal in the FRCP or the Rules Enabling Act.53 To defend work
product protection, the Court turned to a Burkean theory that adversary
traditions could not be set aside by mere implication.54 The “historical and
the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system
of jurisprudence,” Justice William Murphy wrote for the majority, could not
be upset by the discovery rules.55
Finally, it must be said that while progressive academics have long
decried the barriers to access to counsel for low-income Americans, legal
ethics scholars who share that concern have, for more than four decades,
spearheaded a comprehensive assault on the adversary system and the moral
integrity of the legal profession.56 The ethicists’ critiques are rivaled only
by a public relations and lobbying campaign of the corporate bar and its
clients designed to convince the American people (and sitting judges) that
jury trial is corrupt because it provides windfall gains to plaintiffs’ lawyers
and litigants with frivolous claims.57 Legal ethics scholars generally have
49. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
50. Marcus, supra note 48, at 307 (emphasis added) (quoting Petition and Brief of the
United Railroad Workers of America, C.I.O., for Leave to File the Same, Amicus Curiae at
2, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (No. 47)).
51. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507.
52. Id. at 507–09.
53. See id. at 505.
54. See id. at 518–19.
55. Id. at 511.
56. See ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY
67–68 (1988) (describing faith in the adversary system as grounded in “superstition” and
arguing that it is not “capable of underwriting institutional excuses for lawyers” to avoid the
requirements of common morality); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 33–34 (“[T]o take the
value of individuality seriously would require the abandonment of the Ideology of Advocacy
and of legal professionalism. Indeed . . . respect for the value of law itself may require the
repudiation of legal professionalism.”).
Even among progressive lawyers of color, especially those concerned with legal
ethics, the traditional principal-agent structure of the attorney-client relationship, the
traditional use of the courts in the civil rights movement, and even cause lawyering more
broadly have been subjected to withering criticism. See, e.g., GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992).
57. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 121 (2000) (describing distorted media coverage and political debate regarding
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been concerned with precisely the opposite substantive issue—that windfall
gains go to the “haves” at the expense of the “have-nots”58— but both sides
are convinced that the adversary system is deeply flawed and that adversary
values inhibit the proper resolution of disputes.
Should we really be surprised that jury trial has been withering away in
this inhospitable climate? Responsibility for the current state of affairs
certainly cannot be said to rest exclusively with the corporate bar or the
increasingly imperious disposition of the judiciary. Once the field of view
is expanded, it seems clear that a surprisingly broad consensus (at the very
least, a convergence of superficially opposed forces) has supported the
retreat from jury trial and indeed the adversary system as a whole.59
My purpose in this Article is not to offer a hackneyed plea in defense of
jury trial and the adversary system. Whatever might be said in its defense,
no claim can be made that jury trial is the best manner of resolving every
dispute, nor even that jury trial is the appropriate default. Although jury
trial should remain the yardstick against which alternatives are assessed in
due process analysis,60 Judge Henry J. Friendly was right that “common
sense dictates that we must do with less than full trial-type hearings even on
what are clearly adjudicative issues.”61 The number of disputes that raise
“adjudicative issues” is so vast as to make trial-type hearings a practical
impossibility. Moreover, fully transsubstantive procedural rules drawn
from trial practice and extended to every dispute would destroy the flexible,
efficient, and purposive interpretation and application of law in the many
areas where it is obviously appropriate. We have always relied upon more
efficient alternatives in appropriate settings, and quite properly so.
Instead, in the pages that follow, I take up examples in which sworn
officers of the court (judges, prosecutors, city attorneys, court clerks, and
elite lawyers at the DOJ) have responded to bureaucratic imperatives by
civil justice); Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting
the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 451–52 (2004). On the Chamber of
Commerce’s public relations campaign regarding what it calls “lawsuit abuse,” see U.S.
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/ (last visited
Mar. 25, 2017) [http://perma.cc/CTM8-3HPA].
58. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004); David Luban, Taking
Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV.
209 (2003).
59. Powerful material forces have also contributed to the disappearance of the jury trial.
Most obviously, the size of the judiciary did not grow to match the number of case filings in
the mid- and late twentieth century, creating seemingly inexorable pressure to use and
expand procedural tools for pretrial resolution, promote settlement, and shuttle cases out of
the courts and into alternative fora. One report concluded that
the number of pending cases per sitting [district court] judge reached an all-time
high in 2009 and was higher in 2012 than at any point from 1992–2007. A judge
in 1992 had an average of 388 pending cases on his or her docket. By 2012, the
average caseload had jumped to 464 cases—a 20 percent increase.
ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL VACANCIES: THE TRIAL
COURTS 5 (2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Judicial%20
Vacancies%20Report%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA9C-JAH6].
60. See Norman W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of Justice: Courthouse Architecture, Due
Process, and the Dead Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 315 (2012).
61. Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975).
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separating legal decision-making procedures from adversary adjudication
altogether—practically and conceptually disaggregating due process from
judicial process. One may be inclined to dismiss these examples as outliers
in the otherwise laudable development of dispute resolution outside the
traditional confines of the adversary system. The burden of this Article is
to convince you that these limited cases nevertheless warrant close scrutiny
because they signal indifference bordering on contempt toward the
adversary system as well as the associated due process rights of the people
whose lives are affected. The problem of vanishing trials, on this view, is
not that trials are now rare compared to historical baselines or that judges
seem to believe they have failed in some sense when cases go to trial
(though this is an oddly prevalent disposition among judges in a country
that constitutionalized the right to jury trial).62 The problem is that we
appear to be crossing a kind of cultural threshold in which doubts about the
virtues of adversary adjudication not only pervade the bench and bar but
also are converging with larger social forces to affect basic understandings
about the rule of law and what it means to see justice done. The
commitment to due process may itself be vanishing. If that is true, it raises
profound ethical questions about the responsibilities and values of the legal
profession, as well as the kind of legal subject constituted by the avoidance
of adjudication in court.
The first example involves the disaggregation of due process from
judicial process in the legal justification of targeted killing authored by
lawyers for the Obama administration. Here, the formal separation of due
process from judicial process is quite explicit—decisions resulting in the
targeting of American citizens are made exclusively within the executive
branch—and is predicated on a remarkable distortion of Supreme Court
precedent on the Due Process Clause. The second example is the
disaggregation of legal process from adjudication in ordinary civil and
criminal matters. Here, unlike the targeted killing program, courts are
directly and continuously involved but on terms that nullify procedural
rights attendant to adversary adjudication.
II. DISAGGREGATING DUE PROCESS FROM JUDICIAL PROCESS
AT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
The 2011 killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in a drone strike in Yemen, along
with his associate and fellow American citizen Samir Khan, is “the first
time since the Civil War [that] the United States . . . carried out the
deliberate killing of an American citizen as a wartime enemy and without a
trial.”63 The incident was widely covered in the news, on law and national
62. In re Warner Comm. Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[A] bad
settlement is almost always better than a good trial.”).
63. Mark Mazzetti et al., How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America’s Cross Hairs,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/anwar-alawlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html [https://perma.cc/H8DB-NPZT]. On the
complicated national security consequences of the targeted killing of al-Awlaki, see Scott
Shane, The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015),
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security blogs, and in other legal commentary. Opinion varies on the legal
and moral implications of targeted killing, though there is a convergence of
opinion, at least among national security scholars and experts on the law of
war, that the program, properly administered, is both within the President’s
war powers and morally justifiable on the principles of just war theory.64
Critics, and even some supporters of the program, have argued for
modifications in the process for classifying an individual as a target. But
for present purposes, it is Attorney General Eric Holder’s principal
argument in defense of the program, offered in the spring of 2012, that
warrants closer scrutiny. As controversy swirled about the drone program,
he gave a speech at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law in which he
insisted that the requirements of due process could be met without
providing judicial process:
Some have argued that the President is required to get permission from
a federal court before taking action against a United States citizen who is
a senior operational leader of Al Qaeda or associated forces . . . . This is
simply not accurate. “Due process” and “judicial process” are not one and
the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The
Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.65

There are several notable features of this argument. The first is that
Holder’s public defense is consistent with the due process analysis
presented in the leaked internal legal memoranda concluding that the
program is a constitutional exercise of executive power.66 The memoranda
show that DOJ lawyers relied heavily on Mathews v. Eldridge67 and Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld68 to conclude that due process does not require judicial review
notwithstanding the fact that the interests of the individual affected by the
government’s contemplated course of action are at their peak (as they surely
are when the government action is life threatening).69 At a time of war, the
lawyers reasoned, the government’s interest prevails as long as the
individual presents an “imminent” threat (where imminence is construed
broadly to include membership in an organization that is planning terrorist

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/V2S6-E52M].
64. Compare Alberto R. Gonzales, Drones: The Power to Kill, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1 (2013), with David Luban, What Would Augustine Do?: The President, Drones, and Just
War Theory, BOS. REV. (June 6, 2012), http://bostonreview.net/david-luban-the-presidentdrones-augustine-just-war-theory [https://perma.cc/D3MF-HVHX].
65. Charlie Savage, U.S. Law May Allow Killings, Holder Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/us/politics/holder-explainsthreat-that-would-call-for-killing-without-trial.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=holder%20savage&
st=cse [https://perma.cc/F534-VDZW].
66. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN
ASSOCIATED FORCE (2011) [hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER].
67. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
68. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
69. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 66, at 5–6.
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attacks), capture is “infeasible,” and “applicable law of war principles” are
observed.70
One might come to different conclusions about how to weigh the
interests of the individual, the interests of the government, and the risk of
error in the government’s internal deliberations on imminence and
feasibility. And, of course, one might have concerns about the separation of
powers implications of secret deliberations taking place entirely within the
military and national security apparatus of the executive branch, or,
alternatively, the consequences of exposing such deliberations in an Article
III court. For present purposes, the important thing is that both the
Mathews balancing test and the idea that due process and judicial process
are not the same have deep roots in New Deal hostility to the adversary
system and confidence in technocratic expertise.71 At the same time, the
conjunction of these two ideas in Holder’s defense of targeted killing takes
aversion to judicial resolution of disputes far beyond the NLRB’s decision
to eschew formal rulemaking and submerge its policies in the facts of
individual enforcement actions.72
Consider the procedural design of legal decision making in the drone
program: there are lawyers in the mix of agency deliberation on the
classification system for targeted killing, but not courts (except insofar as
earlier published decisions are taken up in the lawyers’ purposive
interpretation of the limits of due process). And the deliberation is
obviously not public as it is in ordinary adjudication by an agency or an
administrative law judge. Indeed, the lawyers’ application of law to fact
turns on almost total deference to secret fact-finding conducted by military
and intelligence experts. Moreover, although the “client” these lawyers
serve is nominally the public, their appointment and removal are contingent
in no small degree on their fidelity to the political officers they serve. They
may pride themselves on their willingness to say “no” when permission for
a program such as this is sought, but the stakes are so high that the
cognitive pressures and personal incentives to say “yes” must be significant.
No one wants the blood of innocent victims of a future attack on their
hands, least of all those whose decisions might prevent such an attack.
Notice too that even if they were determined to say no, the Mathews
balancing test—derived from a series of earlier opinions by the godfather of
New Deal lawyers, Felix Frankfurter—tilts against trial.73 That is not just
because balancing is inherently subjective nor because the modern Supreme
Court has tended to favor the government’s interests (especially in cases of
70. Id. at 1.
71. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
73. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976) (citing Cafeteria & Rest.
Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970)
(citing Joint Anti-Fascist, 341 U.S. 123); see also FCC v. WJR, Goodwill Station, Inc., 337
U.S. 265, 272 (1949) (citing FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 145 (1940)). For
earlier evidence of Frankfurter’s views, see Felix Frankfurter, Hands Off the Investigations,
NEW REPUBLIC, May 21, 1924, at 329.
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national security) and to doubt the virtues of the adversary system. It is
because the core analytic components of the Mathews test are the risk of
error and the marginal cost of additional procedural protections.74 Courts
may imagine jury trial as a kind of gold standard when they engage in
Mathews balancing, but concentrating on accuracy and efficiency, as
opposed to the broader rule of law values that due process supposedly
protects (participation, public transparency, dignity, decentralized decision
making, equality, uniformity, finality, etc.) invites subtraction.75 Attention
gravitates to the features of trial one can leave out and still achieve
acceptably accurate results that do not impose undue burdens in time and
resources on the adjudicator and other participants.76
The risk of error regarding whether al-Awlaki previously had sponsored
terrorist attacks as a member of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
is likely zero given the dossier intelligence officials had compiled by the
time he was killed. There are other scenarios one can imagine in which it
would be much greater, but be that as it may, the trickiest factual questions
in the legal justification of the targeting of al-Awlaki had nothing to do with
his guilt (understood in the conventional retrospective sense) or the depth of
his commitment to AQAP. Rather, they turned on the imminence of any
future attack for which his support was material and, crucially, the
feasibility of capture.77 Whatever one makes of the DOJ’s review process,
or the fact that President Obama took responsibility for the ultimate
decision to list individuals as targets, the determination of the dispositive
facts on these two difficult questions rests exclusively with the relevant
agency technocrats. The most important legal judgments will therefore
almost always be submerged in expert agency fact-finding in an even more
subterranean sense than in NLRB adjudications.
With respect to Holder’s specific argument, the turn of phrase he used
has a long and distinguished pedigree in administrative law and the
jurisprudence of due process. It is, on its surface, quite unremarkable,
expressing as it does the common sense idea that procedures other than jury
trial can be fair as long as they too vindicate core rule of law values. But
use of the phrase in the context of targeted killing squarely contradicts its
traditional application.
Running from the very first Supreme Court case to take up the meaning
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in 1855, Murray’s

74. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
75. The marginalization of other due process values in the Mathews balancing test was
criticized early on. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search
of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court
and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights (pt. I), 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153.
76. That may of course be entirely appropriate in ordinary administrative proceedings
where both internal agency norms of due process are well engrained and judicial review of
agency action is more than a theoretical possibility. I take up the absence of strong norms
and judicial review in Part IV.
77. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 66, at 1.
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Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,78 through a series of famous
cases decided by the New Deal Court,79 the phrase applied to deprivations
of liberty or property (not life) where exceptional circumstances justified
administrative action without providing ex ante notice and a hearing.
Crucially, in each of these cases, the justification turned not merely on
exigent circumstances favoring the government’s interest, but on the
existence and integrity of postdeprivation procedures—most commonly a
combination of administrative adjudication and access to judicial review.
No court or legal officer before Attorney General Holder had ever claimed
that due process is satisfied by a deprivation that, by definition, destroys the
possibility of the victim’s participation in any postdeprivation challenge to
the legality of the administrative action.
Consider the Murray’s Lessee case.80 Samuel Swartwout served as a
“collector of the customs for the port of New York.”81 Eight years into his
service, the account he was supposed to keep for his collections was audited
by the Department of the Treasury and found in arrears.82 A distress
warrant was issued according to the provisions of a federal statute allowing
the Treasury to recover funds misappropriated by customs officers.83
Swartwout’s land was seized and sold by the U.S. marshal pursuant to the
distress warrant. The plaintiffs contended (1) that the statute justifying the
marshal’s seizure and sale unconstitutionally allocated to officers of the
executive branch “judicial power” reserved to the Article III courts and (2)
that the distress warrant process was inconsistent with the guarantee of due
process under the Fifth Amendment.84
The Court tied these arguments together, framing the issue as whether
Swartwout “can be deprived of his liberty, or property, in order to enforce
payment . . . without the exercise of the judicial power of the United States,
and yet by due process of law . . . and if so . . . whether the warrant in
question was such due process of law.”85 The Court began its analysis with
the famous “by the law of the land” language from Magna Carta,
emphasized that due process derives from this guarantee, and rejected the
view that due process is whatever process Congress sets out in an otherwise
lawfully enacted statute.86 Due process must instead be determined by
examining
those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and
statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which

78. 59 U.S. 272 (1855).
79. See, e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936); Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
80. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. 272.
81. Id. at 275.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 275–76.
86. Id. at 276 (insisting that “it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process
which might be devised”).
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are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition
by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country.87

This is a historical test for determining the meaning of procedural due
process.
The Court went on to hold that the distress warrant easily passed this test
because English statutes had long authorized, and her courts long upheld,
the use of summary process to collect debts on behalf of the Crown against
“public defaulters” (as opposed to “ordinary debtors”).88 Moreover, those
practices were well
understood in this country, and entered into the legislation of the colonies
and provinces, and more especially of the States . . . . Not only was the
process of distress in nearly or quite universal use for the collection of
taxes, but what was generally termed a warrant of distress, running against
the body, goods, and chattels of defaulting receivers of public money, was
issued to some public officer, to whom was committed the power to
ascertain the amount of the default, and by such warrant proceed to collect
it.89

Put simply, government employees charged with collecting or handling
public funds were regularly subject to summary proceedings to recoup any
funds they had misappropriated or otherwise failed promptly to report.
The Court emphasized, however, that this summary process used to make
the government whole as against delinquent employees was an exception to
the ordinary presumption in favor of jury trial. Due process, the Court
wrote, “generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular
allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled
course of judicial proceedings.”90 As importantly, Congress had provided
detailed postdeprivation procedures to the customs collector in the statute at
issue. A collector could oppose the warrant by filing a bill and posting
bond on the amount for which he was alleged to be in arrears, and the
statute expressly recognized the right to bring an action in federal court to
challenge the findings of the audit.91 Even if Congress had not provided a
federal right of action, an aggrieved collector could sue the auditor or the
marshal for damages at common law for unlawfully issuing or executing
upon the warrant.
With respect to the Article III claim, the Court flatly conceded that what
the auditor for the Treasury does pursuant to the distress warrant statute is
“in an enlarged sense, a judicial act.”92 But, “[s]o are all those
administrative duties the performance of which involves an inquiry into the
existence of facts and the application to them of rules of law.”93 As the
Court concluded, “[I]t is not sufficient to bring such matters under the
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 277.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 278–79.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 278–79.
Id. at 280.
Id.
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judicial power, that they involve the exercise of judgment upon law and
fact.”94 Murray’s Lessee thus recognizes that due process is not always
judicial process, but it endorsed a historical test that measured deviations
from judicial process according to settled usages, not a balancing test tuned
to the imperatives of innovation in the administrative state. As importantly,
the extrajudicial procedures the Court upheld in Murray’s Lessee not only
provided for the collector’s participation in postseizure administrative
review but also for judicial review of the agency action and any ultra vires
action by the relevant officers.
The first appearance of the phrase “[d]ue process is not necessarily
judicial process” is fully consistent with the holding and analytic
framework of Murray’s Lessee.95 In Reetz v. Michigan,96 the Court
reviewed the criminal prosecution of a doctor for practicing without
registering in and obtaining a license from the state of Michigan.97
Augustus Reetz had mailed a copy of his medical degree to the state
licensing board, but after he received written notice that his application had
been denied, he failed to appear at any of the regularly scheduled board
meetings to prove he was entitled to be certified to practice.98 In the
ensuing criminal trial for practicing without a license, Reetz argued (as had
the customs officer in Murray) that the board certification process was an
unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to an administrative agency
and that the licensing rules violated due process because there was no
provision for judicial review of board decisions.99 The Supreme Court
upheld the process, stressing not only that the board would have granted a
hearing if Reetz had appeared and requested one but also that Michigan
state law recognizes mandamus jurisdiction for judicial review of board
decisions and regularly contemplates application of law to fact by executive
officers:
[W]e know of no provision in the Federal Constitution which forbids a
State from granting to a tribunal, whether called a court or a board of
registration, the final determination of a legal question. Indeed, it not
infrequently happens that a full discharge of their duties compels boards,
or officers of a purely ministerial character, to consider and determine
questions of a legal nature. Due process is not necessarily judicial
process.100

Following Reetz, the idea that due process and judicial process are not
coextensive becomes a common refrain in cases involving the
constitutionality of the regulatory and welfare state during and after the

94. Id.
95. See Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 507 (1903).
96. 188 U.S. 505 (1903).
97. Id. at 509.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 507.
100. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. 272 (1855)).
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New Deal.101 In all of these cases, the point of emphasizing that due
process is not necessarily judicial process is to establish that, although trial
remains the benchmark of due process analysis, the state may, in some
instances, act first and litigate later. It may do so even if the action involves
an element of adjudication (the application of law to fact). The agency
adjudication may occur ex parte in exceptional circumstances. And, as the
Court held in the famous New Deal case Crowell, the agency’s fact-finding
(at least with respect to nonconstitutional facts) may be treated as final.102
The reason the executive branch enjoys these privileges under the Due
Process Clause and Article III is not merely that the state’s interests are
significant, nor that the state is unlikely to err, but rather that its actions
have the “sanction of settled usage” and any ex ante procedural deficits are
offset by procedures for ex post review. Taken in its full doctrinal context,
then, the formal meaning of the phrase “due process does not necessarily
require judicial process” is something like this:
Due process does not require judicial process in advance of a deprivation
of property or liberty if the method of deprivation has earned the sanction
of settled usage and is followed by adequate postdeprivation procedures.

The phrase was never used to justify a complete disaggregation of due
process from judicial process. Yet its use in the context of the drone
program for targeted killing does just that. The drone program does not
have the sanction of settled usage (until now, perhaps), and, crucially, it
destroys the possibility of the target’s participation in any ex post review.
Indeed, given the Supreme Court’s current Bivens jurisprudence, it likely
destroys the possibility of judicial review altogether.103
101. The cases leading up to Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous use of the phrase in Crowell
are Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930) (citing Reetz, 188 U.S. 505), Public
Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904), Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289 (1882),
and Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877). For a post-Crowell analysis, see St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73–78 (1936).
In subsequent cases, Brandeis’s dictum is typically invoked to demonstrate the
importance of judicial review of administrative processes. Compare Ortwein v. Schwab, 410
U.S. 656 (1973), with Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985), Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985), and N.
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Circuit level cases relying on Brandeis’s formulation also have focused on the
question of when judicial review of administrative adjudication is constitutionally required.
See Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting); Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Spagnola v. Mathis, 809
F.2d 16, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 641 F.2d 619, 639 (9th Cir. 1980)
(Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 620
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
102. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932).
103. See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 200 (7th Cir. 2012) (denying the Bivens claim
of American citizens allegedly subjected to abusive interrogation during military detention
on the ground that “congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary
is inappropriate” (quoting United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987))); Rasul v.
Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing and relying upon Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983), to conclude that “‘special factors’ counsel against” recognizing
Bivens liability against military and foreign policy officials allegedly responsible for illegal
detention and mistreatment at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Al-Aulaqi v.
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The disaggregation of due process from judicial process on these terms—
terms that demand total (and, in the absence of leaks, uninformed) public
deference to agency technocrats in a program that ends life—thus represents
the apotheosis of faith in bureaucratic rationality and the New Deal vision
of technocratic expertise as superior to judicial review.104 It is one thing to
say on Schmidtian grounds, or on the grounds of some other theory of the
state of exception, that the law is silent in time of war and therefore that due
process must give way to national security imperatives and the President’s
war powers. Then at least the public knows the true cost of the state of
exception (death at the hands of the state by extralegal means) and can
distinguish any deference required under these conditions from the
deference it might be willing to grant under normal circumstances. But for
the U.S. Attorney General to claim that due process is a meaningful
constraint on a counterterrorism policy that nevertheless tolerates
procedural innovations unknown to settled usage—innovations that preempt
judicial review altogether—is quite pernicious. Due process disaggregated
from judicial process on these terms is but a paper-thin veneer of legality
slipped over the iron fist of the state. Only lawyers supremely confident in
the technocratic expertise of the national security officials upon whom they
must rely, confident in the wisdom and restraint of the policy-level officers
at whose pleasure they serve, and, it must be said, deeply influenced by the
antiadversarial culture of the modern bench and bar, could defend the
program on these terms.
III. “WHERE IS THE SERIOUS STUFF?”:
THE DISAGGREGATION OF DUE PROCESS FROM JUDICIAL PROCESS
IN THE NATION’S MUNICIPAL COURTS
The justification for the targeted killing program is obviously quite
distinct from the operation of due process in the nation’s municipal courts.
Most prominently, judges are absent in the targeted killing program,
whereas, in the municipal courts, judges are intimately involved with
prosecutors, city attorneys, public defenders, and private lawyers in the
design and implementation of procedures for the administration of justice.
What draws the two quite disparate legal settings together is that, in many
municipal courts, due process has been divorced from judicial process—
judges are present, but they preside over and promote a systematic evasion
of formal in-court adjudication (especially trial) on terms that are suggestive
of contempt for the procedural rights of the litigants who appear before
them.
Amy Bach’s book, Ordinary Injustice: How America Holds Court,
recounts widespread procedural defects in the country’s municipal
Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 59 (D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing the Bivens suit of the relatives of
Anwar Al-Awlaki).
104. Agencies make decisions affecting life all the time, but these occur in regulatory
settings where the primary action is taken by the regulated entity, not the agency. See, e.g.,
LUBAN, supra note 56, at 208, 211 (discussing the calculation of the safety/price tradeoff in
automobile design and regulation).
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courts.105 In Georgia, for example, half-hearted efforts on the part of state
and county officials to meet the terms of Gideon v. Wainwright106 resulted,
for decades, in a patchwork system in which some counties used public
defender offices with barely adequate resources while others outsourced
criminal defense work to “a part-time lawyer who is hired based solely on
how cheaply he is prepared to do the work.”107 Over a four-year period in
one such county, the lawyer who held the contract for indigent defense
handled 1,493 cases.108 Only fourteen of those were taken to trial, the rest
were resolved by plea bargain.109 Of 142 cases on the court’s calendar
during a week when Bach attended, the contract lawyer represented eightynine of the defendants and none were taken to trial.110
If that seems like a model of efficient administration of justice on behalf
of clients who have been properly charged with crimes, Bach’s research
into individual cases handled by the lawyer reveals cause for concern:
[The contract lawyer] had little time to talk in detail to his clients, and so
he often had limited information to use in their favor. It was thus difficult
for him to bargain with prosecutors to secure a more lenient sentence, nor
could he produce the ultimate trump card: a willingness to go to trial
when his clients claimed innocence. Many of them risked losing their
homes, children, and livelihoods if they pleaded guilty, and yet his actions
remained the same: His caseload often made it hard for him to clarify the
facts—for example, whether his client had been the ringleader or had
acted without intent or was guilty of a lesser crime—which is the kind of
information that can mitigate the severity of a sentence or get charges
dropped in negotiation.
. . . Under the weight of too many clients to represent, he seemed to
have lost the ability both to decide which cases required attention and to
care one way or the other.111

Many clients complained that the contract lawyer failed to return phone
calls; frequently was not in court when his defendants pled; hastily
discussed plea offers in the halls of the courthouse just before they were
entered; instructed clients to consult with his paralegal when he was busy,
without telling clients that she was not a lawyer; allowed his paralegal to
negotiate pleas with prosecutors; and “rarely” filed pretrial motions
designed to reveal information about the prosecutor’s evidence.112 In one
heartbreaking exchange overheard by Bach, a client appeared to have no
understanding of the implications of entering her plea bargain:
“I know I’m pleading guilty,” she said. “But I don’t know why.”
“Well, we talked about that,” [the contract lawyer] said.
105. AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT (2009).
106. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
107. BACH, supra note 105, at 31 (noting that the practice of contract bidding persisted in
Georgia well after the ABA condemned it in 1985).
108. Id. at 14.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 15.
112. Id. at 13–23, 37–38.
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She shook her head. No, they hadn’t.
“Don’t you remember when we talked?” said [the lawyer], as he
flipped through a file.
“We never talked,” she said, calm and resigned, mocking her lawyer as
if she knew she would get nothing from him and just wanted him to admit
as much.113

In another incident, the lawyer could not identify his own client as
proceedings began and had to be corrected, twice, by the judge.114
An investigation by the state bar’s Indigent Defense Committee and
several lawsuits filed by the Southern Center for Human Rights in Atlanta
challenging the constitutionality of practices in a number of Georgia
counties prompted the state supreme court to investigate.115 The findings of
its Commission on Indigent Defense are jaw dropping.116 One contract
defense lawyer’s testimony, Bach observes, was
astounding in its disregard for his clients. . . . “If [my client is] guilty and
he admits it [to me] why jerk everybody around with a trial?” He
admitted that he didn’t keep records about his cases, saying that “too
many records just give things for people to come back at you, anyway.”
. . . [H]e seemed not to understand counsel’s role, which is, quite
obviously, to test the prosecution’s case and mount a defense. Instead, he
mused that the true role of the defense lawyer was to assume his client’s
guilt. . . . “It’s an error to go in there and assume your client is innocent,”
adding that, “the vast majority of the time if you’re going to go to trial, the
client has been lying to you the whole time.”
. . . [He] sounded more like a lawyer from a totalitarian country.117

Bach notes that the public defender system the state adopted in the wake of
the commission’s report still left defense lawyers in many counties with
staggering caseloads.118 She goes on to show that Georgia is not unique
and that the problem is not simply one of inadequate resources for public
defenders. Rather, prosecutors and judges in courts all around the country
contribute to a system in which guilt is assumed, investigation is shortcircuited, and plea bargains are coerced by setting steep bail, by arbitrarily
denying indigent defendants access to counsel, and by holding them in jail
until they accept a plea in order to be released.119
Bach found, for instance, that a judge who enjoyed widespread
community support in Troy, New York, was removed from the bench by a
state oversight commission for setting constitutionally excessive bail,
failing to ascertain whether defendants were entitled to a public defender,
and, in some instances, entering pleas on the record without the defendant
either being present in court or having agreed to the plea.120 When
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 91, 120.
Id. at 78, 100.
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confronted with evidence regarding these procedural errors by the
commission, the judge reportedly asked his lawyer, “Where is the serious
stuff?”121 In its decision removing him from the bench, the commission
specifically emphasized the judge’s indifference toward the procedural
rights of the accused—the judge failed to “give any persuasive indication
that he recognized the impropriety of his conduct.”122 Local lawyers
nevertheless supported the judge, Bach noted, “because the judge did most
of their work for them, and the community didn’t mind because when
injustice in the lower courts is ostensibly aimed at keeping the streets safe
and the system moving, the only people who suffer are the poor and
neglected.”123
Bach’s book was published in 2009 and in many of the jurisdictions she
studied, attempts have been made to correct the worst abuses. However,
since the DOJ released its report on the municipal court and police
department in Ferguson,124 it has become increasingly clear that the
antiadversarial practices Bach identified persist in our nation’s municipal
courts and affect the administration of both criminal and civil justice.
Particularly in regions with falling property and sales taxes, local
governments have turned to their municipal courts as a source of
revenue.125 Unpaid civil and criminal fines and fees have been reduced to
enforceable civil judgments and, in some jurisdictions arrest warrants are
issued to compel payment.126
For example, in a recently settled case brought against Jennings, a city
adjacent to Ferguson, the municipal court effectively functioned as a
debtors’ prison, generating revenue well in excess of the costs of the
administration of the courts.127 People were arrested and jailed for failure
to make payments on financial penalties imposed for minor violations of the
city’s ordinances.128 The arrests were made without any inquiry into their
ability to pay, onerous payment plans were imposed (leading to years of
mounting debt for late payments, interest, and fees), and arrestees were held
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 117.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 78.
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attach
ments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RJE-NPVF].
125. See, e.g., Campbell Robertson, Missouri City to Pay $4.7 Million to Settle Suit
over Jailing Practices, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/
us/missouri-city-to-pay-4-7-million-to-settle-suit-over-jailing-practices.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/Z4CN-39HK].
126. The problem extends beyond the collection of debts owed to a municipality for civil
and criminal fines and fees. In a number of states, those who owe purely private debts can
be jailed because state law allows private collection agencies to seek, and judges to grant,
imprisonment for civil contempt. See Lea Shepard, Creditors’ Contempt, 2011 BYU L. REV.
1509, 1526–27; see also Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 435 (2011) (refusing to hold that
due process requires access to counsel when the state uses jail time to force debtors to pay).
127. See Complaint, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, 4:15-cv-00252-CEJ (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8,
2015).
128. In 2014, the city allegedly issued “almost 1.4 arrest warrants for every adult, mostly
in cases involving unpaid debt for tickets.” Id. at 3.

2270

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

in appalling conditions in the city’s jail unless they paid up.129 A 2013
report found that cities in and around St. Louis depended on fines “for more
than 40 percent of their general fund” and “that the cities most dependent
on such revenue were majority African-American with large impoverished
populations.”130 In Jennings, the plaintiffs spent nearly 8,300 combined
days in the city’s jail over the five-year period between 2010 and 2015.131
The city, which has a population of about 15,000, “had issued about twice
as many warrants as there were households.”132
Many features of the city’s collection system were unconstitutional, but
two warrant special attention. First, court sessions were deliberately
designed to minimize public scrutiny and maximize the intimidation of
alleged debtors. The court was in session only once a week for jailed
debtors to appear.133 Thus, failure to pay automatically resulted in as much
as a week in jail before being brought before a judge. While in jail,
corrections officers routinely verbally abused debtors and offered release
upon payment of arbitrarily specified sums.134 Weekly court sessions for
detainees were closed to the public (the courtroom and courthouse doors
were locked during the “confined docket”); the prosecutor represented the
city, but no counsel was provided to detainees; people were told that they
would remain in jail unless they made a payment but were not offered
alternatives to incarceration and no inquiry was made into their ability to
pay; and people were not advised of their legal rights under state and
federal law.135 Toward the end of the confined docket, the courthouse
allegedly was opened so that debtors who had not been arrested and were
arriving for the “payment docket” could hear the prosecutor and judge
“threatening those who cannot afford their debts with longer jail terms and
sending those unable to pay back to the City jail.”136
A second significant feature is that the system of fines, warrant, arrest,
indefinite detention was not employed if a debtor retained private counsel.
In those cases, the court apparently functioned by the notice and hearing
standards of procedural due process. Thus, the court and participating
attorneys were not oblivious to the requirements of due process. They
129. Id. at 1–2. The jail cells were allegedly overcrowded; arrestees were denied
toothbrushes, toothpaste, and soap; the walls were smeared with mucus, blood, and feces;
untreated illnesses spread to other inmates, and they were denied access to prescription
medication; the arrestees went days and sometimes weeks without access to a shower;
women were denied hygiene products for menstruation; and they were “provided food so
insufficient and lacking in nutrition that inmates [we]re forced to compete to perform
demeaning janitorial labor for extra food rations.” Id. at 2.
130. See Robertson, supra note 125.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Complaint, supra note 127, at 5.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id. at 40–41.
136. Id. at 41 n.23. Although the “payment docket” was open to the public, the
proceedings were conducted “as private bench conferences, with the defendant standing at
the bench with the judge. The courtroom audience [wa]s unable to hear the content of the
proceedings, other than the words of the judge, who sp[oke] into a microphone. No
transcripts or audio recordings of proceedings [we]re available.” Id.
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knew perfectly well what fair procedures should look like. They just did
not believe certain debtors were entitled to those procedures, or, in a craven
attempt to expand the city’s revenue, they jettisoned those procedures. Or
both. The consequence, in any event, was to disaggregate judicial process
from any plausible theory of due process of law.
Squalid jail conditions are not new. The absence of attorneys for poor
and low-income people caught up in civil, criminal, and administrative
proceedings is not new. Judges who skirt procedural formalities to mete out
what they take to be substantive justice are not new. And the kinds of
cognitive and bureaucratic pressures that cause people of goodwill to
commit unspeakable injustices are known to us as a matter of theory and
practice.137 But it is remarkable how long the city ran its courts for the
extraction of revenue from its citizens and how long the court and attorneys
in the jurisdiction worked within and normalized a parasitic system that was
so obviously dehumanizing for arrestees and, concomitantly, for the
responsible officials. Indeed, but for the DOJ’s Ferguson report, which
itself was an outgrowth of street protests in Ferguson, the flagrantly
unconstitutional practices in Jennings might have continued much longer.
CONCLUSION
It may be tempting to dismiss Jennings and the examples Bach describes
as aberrations largely restricted to the criminal justice system or to the
points where debt collection and criminal law intersect. But even in civil
and administrative courts, where there is no overtly contumacious
disposition toward the requirements of due process, massive delays and
arbitrary outcomes raise profound questions about whether justice is being
administered in a fair and evenhanded manner.138 Here too, crushing
caseloads, long delays, rushed or circumvented hearings, superficial
treatment of claims, and rubber-stamping are dehumanizing for litigants and
officers of the court.

137. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 237 (2007).
138. On delays and high variations in outcomes of immigration cases, see U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-72, ASYLUM: VARIATION EXISTS IN OUTCOMES OF
APPLICATIONS ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES (2016). On indefinite detention
without bond hearings in immigration cases, see Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Weighs Jailed
Immigrants’ Right to Periodic Hearings, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/us/politics/supreme-court-jailed-immigrants.html
[https://perma.cc/B627-PYQF]. On delays in the processing of veterans benefits claims, see
Aaron Glantz, VA Struggling with Promise to End Long Benefits Waits This Year, REVEAL
(July 23, 2015), https://www.revealnews.org/article/va-struggling-with-promise-to-end-longbenefits-waits-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/C6S8-BCHU]. On the respects in which the
deferential standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 invites lower federal courts to “rubber-stamp” denials in habeas cases involving
unconstitutional state action, see Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute:
An (Opinionated) User’s Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103 (1998). On the Supreme Court’s
deference to “postcard” denials of habeas petitions by state courts, see Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86 (2011).
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Judge Friendly may have been right to ask in 1975 if “we would not do
better to abandon the adversary system in certain areas of mass justice,”139
but four decades later we can no longer blink at the hard facts. The
abandonment of the adversary system has not been restricted to the areas he
imagined, and, in many of the areas of mass justice in which he rightly
called for experimentation, adequate alternatives have not been developed.
Judge Friendly certainly did not advocate abandoning due process along
with the adversary system, but the fact of the matter is that it has all too
often been a casualty of the procedural innovation he advocated and the
Supreme Court has since endorsed.
We have thus arrived at a strange moment in the history of due process.
As the commitment to adversarialism has faded and the formalities of due
process are brushed aside in ordinary cases, lavish media coverage of
sensational cases that do go to trial often showcases “hyper-adversarial”
conduct in court.140 For the lay public, as Bach observes, this helps to
“reinforce” the myth that the profession’s commitment to due process
remains “rigorous.”141 If Bach is right, due process and judicial process are
not only disaggregated in ordinary cases decided in rooms where no
cameras can be found, that disaggregation is further obscured by coverage
of procedural decadence in the rare cases that go to trial. Paradoxically,
then, the culture of antiadversarialism feeds off of the embers of our
adversary traditions.
For the legal profession, unlike the lay public, the disaggregation of due
process and judicial process is no obscurity.
The culture of
antiadversarialism and the strange procedures it sustains are a product of
our collective hubris.142 We are the children of a centuries-long tradition of
due process and professionalism derived from the adversary system and
jury trial. It is a tradition we have mythologized even as we have subjected
it to withering criticism and set it aside in our technocratic confidence that
more rational and efficient means can meet the demands of mass justice.
And we have done so in full knowledge of the constraints (bureaucratic and
otherwise) that regularly compromise the integrity of supposedly more
rational and efficient means. In our own clumsy and well-intentioned way,
we have become Victor Frankenstein.
There is no unmaking the monster. The demands of mass justice are too
great to permit a broad revival of trial procedures. But that does not mean
the traditional link between due process and judicial process should be
severed and that we should abandon jury trial as the standard against which
procedural alternatives are judged. Indeed, as technology begins to reshape
the capacities of courts and agencies to design alternatives to trial, and as it
enables law enforcement practices such as predictive policing, the
connection may be more important than ever. Nowhere is the promise and
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Friendly, supra note 61, at 1289.
BACH, supra note 105, at 260.
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See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 576 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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hubris of technocratic expertise greater than among those seeking to reduce
the administration of justice to lines of code.
The relationship between due process and judicial process is more than
doctrinal—a connection that courts sustain or weaken when confronted with
claims that a specific process violates due process and that additional
procedural safeguards are constitutionally required. It is a relationship that
depends upon the profession honoring the underlying ethical, social, and
democratic values historically protected by judicial process. This is perhaps
most important in areas of the administration of justice in which trial is
infeasible. If we are to have due process without judicial process, those
responsible for innovations in the administration of justice must hold these
values dear.

